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ABSTRACT
It is important to detect anomalous inputs when deploying machine learning
systems. The use of larger and more complex inputs in deep learning magnifies
the difficulty of distinguishing between anomalous and in-distribution examples.
At the same time, diverse image and text data are available in enormous quantities.
We propose leveraging these data to improve deep anomaly detection by training
anomaly detectors against an auxiliary dataset of outliers, an approach we call
Outlier Exposure (OE). This enables anomaly detectors to generalize and detect
unseen anomalies. In extensive experiments on natural language processing and
small- and large-scale vision tasks, we find that Outlier Exposure significantly
improves detection performance. We also observe that cutting-edge generative
models trained on CIFAR-10 may assign higher likelihoods to SVHN images
than to CIFAR-10 images; we use OE to mitigate this issue. We also analyze the
flexibility and robustness of Outlier Exposure, and identify characteristics of the
auxiliary dataset that improve performance.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine Learning systems in deployment often encounter data that is unlike the model’s training
data. This can occur in discovering novel astronomical phenomena, finding unknown diseases, or
detecting sensor failure. In these situations, models that can detect anomalies (Liu et al., 2018;
Emmott et al., 2013) are capable of correctly flagging unusual examples for human intervention, or
carefully proceeding with a more conservative fallback policy.
Behind many machine learning systems are deep learning models (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) which
can provide high performance in a variety of applications, so long as the data seen at test time is
similar to the training data. However, when there is a distribution mismatch, deep neural network
classifiers tend to give high confidence predictions on anomalous test examples (Nguyen et al.,
2015). This can invalidate the use of prediction probabilities as calibrated confidence estimates
(Guo et al., 2017), and makes detecting anomalous examples doubly important.
Several previous works seek to address these problems by giving deep neural network classifiers
a means of assigning anomaly scores to inputs. These scores can then be used for detecting out-
of-distribution (OOD) examples (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017; Lee et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018).
These approaches have been demonstrated to work surprisingly well for complex input spaces, such
as images, text, and speech. Moreover, they do not require modeling the full data distribution, but
instead can use heuristics for detecting unmodeled phenomena. Several of these methods detect
unmodeled phenomena by using representations from only in-distribution data.
In this paper, we investigate a complementary method where we train models to detect unmodeled
data by learning cues for whether an input is unmodeled. While it is difficult to model the full data
distribution, we can learn effective heuristics for detecting out-of-distribution inputs by exposing
the model to OOD examples, thus learning a more conservative concept of the inliers and enabling
the detection of novel forms of anomalies. We propose leveraging diverse, realistic datasets for this
purpose, with a method we call Outlier Exposure (OE). OE provides a simple and effective way to
consistently improve existing methods for OOD detection.
Through numerous experiments, we extensively evaluate the broad applicability of Outlier Expo-
sure. For multiclass neural networks, we provide thorough results on Computer Vision and Natural
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Language Processing tasks which show that Outlier Exposure can help anomaly detectors generalize
to and perform well on unseen distributions of outliers, even on large-scale images. We also demon-
strate that Outlier Exposure provides gains over several existing approaches to out-of-distribution
detection. Our results also show the flexibility of Outlier Exposure, as we can train various mod-
els with different sources of outlier distributions. Additionally, we establish that Outlier Exposure
can make density estimates of OOD samples significantly more useful for OOD detection. Fi-
nally, we demonstrate that Outlier Exposure improves the calibration of neural network classifiers
in the realistic setting where a fraction of the data is OOD. Our code is made publicly available at
https://github.com/hendrycks/outlier-exposure.
2 RELATED WORK
Out-of-Distribution Detection with Deep Networks. Hendrycks & Gimpel (2017) demonstrate
that a deep, pre-trained classifier has a lower maximum softmax probability on anomalous examples
than in-distribution examples, so a classifier can conveniently double as a consistently useful out-
of-distribution detector. Building on this work, DeVries & Taylor (2018) attach an auxiliary branch
onto a pre-trained classifier and derive a new OOD score from this branch. Liang et al. (2018) present
a method which can improve performance of OOD detectors that use a softmax distribution. In
particular, they make the maximum softmax probability more discriminative between anomalies and
in-distribution examples by pre-processing input data with adversarial perturbations (Goodfellow
et al., 2015). Unlike in our work, their parameters are tailored to each source of anomalies.
Lee et al. (2018) train a classifier concurrently with a GAN (Radford et al., 2016; Goodfellow et al.,
2014), and the classifier is trained to have lower confidence on GAN samples. For each testing
distribution of anomalies, they tune the classifier and GAN using samples from that out-distribution,
as discussed in Appendix B of their work. Unlike Liang et al. (2018); Lee et al. (2018), in this work
we train our method without tuning parameters to fit specific types of anomaly test distributions, so
our results are not directly comparable with their results. Many other works (de Vries et al., 2016;
Subramanya et al., 2017; Malinin & Gales, 2018; Bevandic et al., 2018) also encourage the model
to have lower confidence on anomalous examples. Recently, Liu et al. (2018) provide theoretical
guarantees for detecting out-of-distribution examples under the assumption that a suitably powerful
anomaly detector is available.
Utilizing Auxiliary Datasets. Outlier Exposure uses an auxiliary dataset entirely disjoint from
test-time data in order to teach the network better representations for anomaly detection. Goodfel-
low et al. (2015) train on adversarial examples to increased robustness. Salakhutdinov et al. (2011)
pre-train unsupervised deep models on a database of web images for stronger features. Radford
et al. (2017) train an unsupervised network on a corpus of Amazon reviews for a month in order
to obtain quality sentiment representations. Zeiler & Fergus (2014) find that pre-training a network
on the large ImageNet database (Russakovsky et al., 2015) endows the network with general
representations that are useful in many fine-tuning applications. Chen & Gupta (2015); Mahajan
et al. (2018) show that representations learned from images scraped from the nigh unlimited source
of search engines and photo-sharing websites improve object detection performance.
3 OUTLIER EXPOSURE
We consider the task of deciding whether or not a sample is from a learned distribution called Din.
Samples from Din are called “in-distribution,” and otherwise are said to be “out-of-distribution”
(OOD) or samples from Dout. In real applications, it may be difficult to know the distribution
of outliers one will encounter in advance. Thus, we consider the realistic setting where Dout is
unknown. Given a parametrized OOD detector and an Outlier Exposure (OE) dataset DOEout , disjoint
from Dtestout , we train the model to discover signals and learn heuristics to detect whether a query is
sampled from Din or DOEout . We find that these heuristics generalize to unseen distributions Dout.
Deep parametrized anomaly detectors typically leverage learned representations from an auxiliary
task, such as classification or density estimation. Given a model f and the original learning objective
L, we can thus formalize Outlier Exposure as minimizing the objective
E(x,y)∼Din [L(f(x), y) + λEx′∼DOEout [LOE(f(x′), f(x), y)]]
over the parameters of f . In cases where labeled data is not available, then y can be ignored.
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Outlier Exposure can be applied with many types of data and original tasks. Hence, the specific
formulation of LOE is a design choice, and depends on the task at hand and the OOD detector
used. For example, when using the maximum softmax probability baseline detector (Hendrycks &
Gimpel, 2017), we set LOE to the cross-entropy from f(x′) to the uniform distribution (Lee et al.,
2018). When the original objective L is density estimation and labels are not available, we set LOE
to a margin ranking loss on the log probabilities f(x′) and f(x).
4 EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate OOD detectors with and without OE on a wide range of datasets. Each evaluation con-
sists of an in-distribution dataset Din used to train an initial model, a dataset of anomalous examples
DOEout , and a baseline detector to which we apply OE. We describe the datasets in Section 4.2. The
OOD detectors and LOE losses are described on a case-by-case basis.
In the first experiment, we show that OE can help detectors generalize to new text and image
anomalies. This is all accomplished without assuming access to the test distribution during training
or tuning, unlike much previous work. In the confidence branch experiment, we show that OE is
flexible and complements a binary anomaly detector. Then we demonstrate that using synthetic
outliers does not work as well as using real and diverse data; previously it was assumed that we
need synthetic data or carefully selected close-to-distribution data, but real and diverse data is
enough. We conclude with experiments in density estimation. In these experiments we find that a
cutting-edge density estimator unexpectedly assigns higher density to out-of-distribution samples
than in-distribution samples, and we ameliorate this surprising behavior with Outlier Exposure.
4.1 EVALUATING OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION DETECTION METHODS
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Figure 1: ROC curve with Tiny Im-
ageNet (Din) and Textures (Dtestout ).
We evaluate out-of-distribution detection methods on their
ability to detect OOD points. For this purpose, we treat the
OOD examples as the positive class, and we evaluate three
metrics: area under the receiver operating characteristic curve
(AUROC), area under the precision-recall curve (AUPR), and
the false positive rate at N% true positive rate (FPRN ). The
AUROC and AUPR are holistic metrics that summarize the
performance of a detection method across multiple thresholds.
The AUROC can be thought of as the probability that an
anomalous example is given a higher OOD score than a
in-distribution example (Davis & Goadrich, 2006). Thus, a
higher AUROC is better, and an uninformative detector has
an AUROC of 50%. The AUPR is useful when anomalous
examples are infrequent (Manning & Schu¨tze, 1999), as
it takes the base rate of anomalies into account. During
evaluation with these metrics, the base rate of Dtestout to Dtestin
test examples in all of our experiments is 1:5.
Whereas the previous two metrics represent the detection performance across various thresholds, the
FPRN metric represents performance at one strict threshold. By observing performance at a strict
threshold, we can make clear comparisons among strong detectors. The FPRN metric (Liu et al.,
2018; Kumar et al., 2016; Balntas et al., 2016) is the probability that an in-distribution example
(negative) raises a false alarm when N% of anomalous examples (positive) are detected, so a lower
FPRN is better. Capturing nearly all anomalies with few false alarms can be of high practical value.
4.2 DATASETS
4.2.1 IN-DISTRIBUTION DATASETS
SVHN. The SVHN dataset (Netzer et al., 2011) contains 32× 32 color images of house numbers.
There are ten classes comprised of the digits 0-9. The training set has 604, 388 images, and the test
set has 26, 032 images. For preprocessing, we rescale the pixels to be in the interval [0, 1].
CIFAR. The two CIFAR (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) datasets contain 32 × 32 natural color
images. CIFAR-10 has ten classes while CIFAR-100 has 100. CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 classes
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are disjoint but have similiarities. For example, CIFAR-10 has “automobiles” and “trucks” but not
CIFAR-100’s “pickup truck” class. Both have 50, 000 training images and 10, 000 test images. For
this and the remaining image datasets, each image is standardized channel-wise.
Tiny ImageNet. The Tiny ImageNet dataset (Johnson et al.) is a 200-class subset of the ImageNet
(Russakovsky et al., 2015) dataset where images are resized and cropped to 64 × 64 resolution.
The dataset’s images were cropped using bounding box information so that cropped images contain
the target, unlike Downsampled ImageNet (Chrabaszcz et al., 2017). The training set has 100, 000
images and the test set has 10, 000 images.
Places365. The Places365 training dataset (Zhou et al., 2017) consists in 1, 803, 460 large-scale
photographs of scenes. Each photograph belongs to one of 365 classes.
20 Newsgroups. 20 Newsgroups is a text classification dataset of newsgroup documents with 20
classes and approximately 20, 000 examples split evenly among the classes. We use the standard
60/40 train/test split.
TREC. TREC is a question classification dataset with 50 fine-grained classes and 5, 952 individ-
ual questions. We reserve 500 examples for the test set, and use the rest for training.
SST. The Stanford Sentiment Treebank dataset (Socher et al., 2013) consists of movie reviews
expressing positive or negative sentiment. SST has 8, 544 reviews for training and 2, 210 for testing.
4.2.2 OUTLIER EXPOSURE DATASETS
80 Million Tiny Images. 80 Million Tiny Images (Torralba et al., 2008) is a large-scale, diverse
dataset of 32×32 natural images scrapped from the web. We use this dataset asDOEout for experiments
with SVHN, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100 asDin. We remove all examples of 80 Million Tiny Images
which appear in the CIFAR datasets, so that DOEout and Dtestout are disjoint. In Section 5 we note that
only a small fraction of this dataset is necessary for successful OE.
ImageNet-22K. We use the ImageNet dataset with images from approximately 22 thousand
classes as DOEout for Tiny ImageNet and Places365 since images from 80 Million Tiny Images are
too low-resolution. To make DOEout and Dtestout are disjoint, images in ImageNet-1K are removed.
WikiText-2. WikiText-2 is a corpus of Wikipedia articles typically used for language modeling.
We use WikiText-2 as DOEout for language modeling experiments with Penn Treebank as Din. For
classification tasks on 20 Newsgroups, TREC, and SST, we treat each sentence of WikiText-2 as an
individual example, and use simple filters to remove low-quality sentences.
4.3 MULTICLASS CLASSIFICATION
In what follows, we use Outlier Exposure to enhance the performance of existing OOD detection
techniques with multiclass classification as the original task. Throughout the following experiments,
we let x ∈ X be a classifier’s input and y ∈ Y = {1, 2, . . . , k} be a class. We also represent the
classifier with the function f : X → Rk, such that for any x, 1Tf(x) = 1 and f(x)  0.
Maximum Softmax Probability (MSP). Consider the maximum softmax probability baseline
(Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017) which gives an input x the OOD score −maxc fc(x). Out-of-
distribution samples are drawn from various unseen distributions (Appendix A). For each task, we
test with approximately twice the number of Dtestout distributions compared to most other papers, and
we also test on NLP tasks. The quality of the OOD example scores are judged with the metrics
described in Section 4.1. For this multiclass setting, we perform Outlier Exposure by fine-tuning a
pre-trained classifier f so that its posterior is more uniform on DOEout samples. Specifically, the fine-
tuning objective is E(x,y)∼Din [− log fy(x)] + λEx∼DOEout [H(U ; f(x))], where H is the cross entropy
and U is the uniform distribution over k classes. When there is class imbalance, we could encourage
f(x) to match (P (y = 1), . . . , P (y = k)); yet for the datasets we consider, matching U works well
enough. Also, note that training from scratch with OE can result in even better performance than
fine-tuning (Appendix C). This approach works on different architectures as well (Appendix D).
Unlike Liang et al. (2018); Lee et al. (2018) and like Hendrycks & Gimpel (2017); DeVries & Taylor
(2018), we do not tune our hyperparameters for each Dtestout distribution, so that Dtestout is kept unknown
like with real-world anomalies. Instead, the λ coefficients were determined early in experimentation
with validation Dvalout distributions described in Appendix A. In particular, we use λ = 0.5 for vision
experiments and λ = 1.0 for NLP experiments. Like previous OOD detection methods involving
network fine-tuning, we chose λ so that impact on classification accuracy is negligible.
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For nearly all of the vision experiments, we train Wide Residual Networks (Zagoruyko & Ko-
modakis, 2016) and then fine-tune network copies with OE for 10 epochs. However we use a pre-
trained ResNet-18 for Places365. For NLP experiments, we train 2-layer GRUs (Cho et al., 2014)
for 5 epochs, then fine-tune network copies with OE for 2 epochs. Networks trained on CIFAR-
10 or CIFAR-100 are exposed to images from 80 Million Tiny Images, and the Tiny ImageNet
and Places365 classifiers are exposed to ImageNet-22K. NLP classifiers are exposed to WikiText-2.
Further architectural and training details are in Appendix B. For all tasks, OE improves average
performance by a large margin. Averaged results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Sample ROC curves
are shown in Figures 1 and 4. Detailed results on individual Dtestout datasets are in Table 7 and Table 8
in Appendix A. Notice that the SVHN classifier with OE can be used to detect new anomalies such
as emojis and street view alphabet letters, even though DtestOE is a dataset of natural images. Thus,
Outlier Exposure helps models to generalize to unseenDtestout distributions far better than the baseline.
FPR95 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din MSP +OE MSP +OE MSP +OE
SVHN 6.3 0.1 98.0 100.0 91.1 99.9
CIFAR-10 34.9 9.5 89.3 97.8 59.2 90.5
CIFAR-100 62.7 38.5 73.1 87.9 30.1 58.2
Tiny ImageNet 66.3 14.0 64.9 92.2 27.2 79.3
Places365 63.5 28.2 66.5 90.6 33.1 71.0
Table 1: Out-of-distribution image detection for the maximum softmax probability (MSP) baseline
detector and the MSP detector after fine-tuning with Outlier Exposure (OE). Results are percentages
and also an average of 10 runs. Expanded results are in Appendix A.
FPR90 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din MSP +OE MSP +OE MSP +OE
20 Newsgroups 42.4 4.9 82.7 97.7 49.9 91.9
TREC 43.5 0.8 82.1 99.3 52.2 97.6
SST 74.9 27.3 61.6 89.3 22.9 59.4
Table 2: Comparisons between the MSP baseline and the MSP of the natural language classifier
fine-tuned with OE. Results are percentages and averaged over 10 runs.
Confidence Branch. A recently proposed OOD detection technique (DeVries & Taylor, 2018)
involves appending an OOD scoring branch b : X → [0, 1] onto a deep network. Trained with
samples from only Din, this branch estimates the network’s confidence on any input. The creators
of this technique made their code publicly available, so we use their code to train new 40-4 Wide
Residual Network classifiers. We fine-tune the confidence branch with Outlier Exposure by adding
0.5Ex∼DOEout [log b(x)] to the network’s original optimization objective. In Table 3, the baseline values
are derived from the maximum softmax probabilities produced by the classifier trained with DeVries
& Taylor (2018)’s publicly available training code. The confidence branch improves over this MSP
detector, and after OE, the confidence branch detects anomalies more effectively.
FPR95 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din MSP Branch +OE MSP Branch +OE MSP Branch +OE
CIFAR-10 49.3 38.7 20.8 84.4 86.9 93.7 51.9 48.6 66.6
CIFAR-100 55.6 47.9 42.0 77.6 81.2 85.5 36.5 44.4 54.7
Tiny ImageNet 64.3 66.9 20.1 65.3 63.4 90.6 30.3 25.7 75.2
Table 3: Comparison among the maximum softmax probability, Confidence Branch, and Confidence
Branch + OE OOD detectors. The same network architecture is used for all three detectors. All
results are percentages, and averaged across all Dtestout datasets.
Synthetic Outliers. Outlier Exposure leverages the simplicity of downloading real datasets, but it
is possible to generate synthetic outliers. Note that we made an attempt to distort images with noise
and use these as outliers for OE, but the classifier quickly memorized this statistical pattern and did
not detect new OOD examples any better than before (Hafner et al., 2018). A method with better
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success is from Lee et al. (2018). They carefully train a GAN to generate synthetic examples near the
classifier’s decision boundary. The classifier is encouraged to have a low maximum softmax proba-
bility on these synthetic examples. For CIFAR classifiers, they mention that a GAN can be a better
source of anomalies than datasets such as SVHN. In contrast, we find that the simpler approach of
drawing anomalies from a diverse dataset is sufficient for marked improvements in OOD detection.
We train a 40-4 Wide Residual Network using Lee et al. (2018)’s publicly available code, and use
the network’s maximum softmax probabilities as our baseline. Another classifier trains concurrently
with a GAN so that the classifier assigns GAN-generated examples a high OOD score. We want each
Dtestout to be novel. Consequently we use their code’s default hyperparameters, and exactly one model
encounters all tested Dtestout distributions. This is unlike their work since, for each Dtestout distribution,
they train and tune a new network. We do not evaluate on Tiny ImageNet, Places365, nor text, since
DCGANs cannot stably generate such images and text reliably. Lastly, we take the network trained
in tandem with a GAN and fine-tune it with OE. Table 4 shows the large gains from using OE with
a real and diverse dataset over using synthetic samples from a GAN.
FPR95 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din MSP +GAN +OE MSP +GAN +OE MSP +GAN +OE
CIFAR-10 32.3 37.3 11.8 88.1 89.6 97.2 51.1 59.0 88.5
CIFAR-100 66.6 66.2 49.0 67.2 69.3 77.9 27.4 33.0 44.7
Table 4: Comparison among the maximum softmax probability (MSP), MSP + GAN, and MSP +
GAN + OE OOD detectors. The same network architecture is used for all three detectors. All results
are percentages and averaged across all Dtestout datasets.
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Figure 2: OOD scores from
PixelCNN++ on images from
CIFAR-10 and SVHN.
Density estimators learn a probability density function over the data
distribution Din. Anomalous examples should have low probability
density, as they are scarce in Din by definition (Nalisnick et al.,
2019). Consequently, density estimates are another means by which
to score anomalies (Zong et al., 2018). We show the ability of OE
to improve density estimates on low-probability, outlying data.
PixelCNN++. Autoregressive neural density estimators provide a
way to parametrize the probability density of image data. Although
sampling from these architectures is slow, they allow for evaluating
the probability density with a single forward pass through a CNN,
making them promising candidates for OOD detection. We use Pix-
elCNN++ (Salimans et al., 2017) as a baseline OOD detector, and
we train it on CIFAR-10. The OOD score of example x is the bits
per pixel (BPP), defined as nll(x)/num_pixels, where nll is the
negative log-likelihood. With this loss we fine-tune for 2 epochs us-
ing OE, which we find is sufficient for the training loss to converge.
Here OE is implemented with a margin loss over the log-likelihood
difference between in-distribution and anomalous examples, so that
the loss for a sample xin from Din and point xout from DOEout is
max{0,num_pixels+ nll(xin)− nll(xout)}.
Results are shown in Table 5. Notice that PixelCNN++ without OE unexpectedly assigns lower BPP
from SVHN images than CIFAR-10 images. For allDtestout datasets, OE significantly improves results.
Language Modeling. We next explore using OE on language models. We use QRNN (Merity
et al., 2018a;b) language models as baseline OOD detectors. For the OOD score, we use bits per
character (BPC) or bits per word (BPW), defined as nll(x)/sequence_length, where nll(x) is
the negative log-likelihood of the sequence x. Outlier Exposure is implemented by adding the cross
entropy to the uniform distribution on tokens from sequences in DOEout as an additional loss term.
For Din, we convert the language-modeling version of Penn Treebank, split into sequences of length
70 for backpropagation for word-level models, and 150 for character-level models. We do not train
or evaluate with preserved hidden states as in BPTT. This is because retaining hidden states would
6
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FPR95 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din Dtestout BPP +OE BPP +OE BPP +OE
CIFAR-10
Gaussian 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.6
Rademacher 61.4 50.3 44.2 56.5 14.2 17.3
Blobs 17.2 1.3 93.2 99.5 60.0 96.2
Textures 96.8 48.9 69.4 88.8 40.9 70.0
SVHN 98.8 86.9 15.8 75.8 9.7 60.0
Places365 86.1 50.3 74.8 89.3 38.6 70.4
LSUN 76.9 43.2 76.4 90.9 36.5 72.4
CIFAR-100 96.1 89.8 52.4 68.5 19.0 41.9
Mean 66.6 46.4 65.8 83.7 39.9 66.0
Table 5: OOD detection results with a PixelCNN++ density estimator, and the same estimator after
applying OE. The model’s bits per pixel (BPP) scores each sample. All results are percentages. Test
distributions Dtestout are described in Appendix A.
greatly simplify the task of OOD detection. Accordingly, the OOD detection task is to provide a
score for 70- or 150-token sequences in the unseen Dtestout datasets.
We train word-level models for 300 epochs, and character-level models for 50 epochs. We then
fine-tune using OE on WikiText-2 for 5 epochs. For the character-level language model, we create
a character-level version of WikiText-2 by converting words to lowercase and leaving out characters
which do not appear in PTB. OOD detection results for the word-level and character-level language
models are shown in Table 6; expanded results andDtestout descriptions are in Appendix F. In all cases,
OE improves over the baseline, and the improvement is especially large for the word-level model.
FPR90 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din BPC/BPW +OE BPC/BPW +OE BPC/BPW +OE
PTB Characters 99.0 89.4 77.5 86.3 76.0 86.7
PTB Words 48.5 0.98 81.2 99.2 44.0 97.8
Table 6: OOD detection results on Penn Treebank language models. Results are percentages aver-
aged over the Dtestout datasets. Expanded results are in Appendix F.
5 DISCUSSION
Extensions to Multilabel Classifiers and the Reject Option. Outlier Exposure can work in more
classification regimes than just those considered above. For example, a multilabel classifier trained
on CIFAR-10 obtains an 88.8% mean AUROC when using the maximum prediction probability
as the OOD score. By training with OE to decrease the classifier’s output probabilities on OOD
samples, the mean AUROC increases to 97.1%. This is slightly less than the AUROC for a
multiclass model tuned with OE. An alternative OOD detection formulation is to give classifiers
a “reject class” (Bartlett & Wegkamp, 2008). Outlier Exposure is also flexible enough to improve
performance in this setting, but we find that even with OE, classifiers with the reject option or
multilabel outputs are not as competitive as OOD detectors with multiclass outputs.
Flexibility in ChoosingDOEout . Early in experimentation, we found that the choice ofDOEout is impor-
tant for generalization to unseen Dtestout distributions. For example, adding Gaussian noise to samples
fromDin to createDOEout does not teach the network to generalize to unseen anomaly distributions for
complexDin. Similarly, we found in Section 4.3 that synthetic anomalies do not work as well as real
data for DOEout . In contrast, our experiments demonstrate that the large datasets of realistic anomalies
described in Section 4.2.2 do generalize to unseen Dtestout distributions.
In addition to size and realism, we found diversity of DOEout to be an important factor. Concretely, a
CIFAR-100 classifier with CIFAR-10 as DOEout hardly improves over the baseline. A CIFAR-10 clas-
sifier exposed to ten CIFAR-100 outlier classes corresponds to an average AUPR of 78.5%. Exposed
to 30 such classes, the classifier’s average AUPR becomes 85.1%. Next, 50 classes corresponds to
85.3%, and from thereon additional CIFAR-100 classes barely improve performance. This suggests
that dataset diversity is important, not just size. In fact, experiments in this paper often used around
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1% of the images in the 80 Million Tiny Images dataset since we only briefly fine-tuned the models.
We also found that using only 50,000 examples from this dataset led to a negligible degradation in
detection performance. Additionally,DOEout datasets with significantly different statistics can perform
similarly. For instance, using the Project Gutenberg dataset in lieu of WikiText-2 for DOEout in the
SST experiments gives an average AUROC of 90.1% instead of 89.3%.
Closeness of Dtestout , DOEout , and Dtestin . Our experiments show several interesting effects of the close-
ness of the datasets involved. Firstly, we find that Dtestout and DOEout need not be close for training with
OE to improve performance on Dtestout . In Appendix A, we observe that an OOD detector for SVHN
has its performance improve with Outlier Exposure even though (1)DOEout samples are images of nat-
ural scenes rather than digits, and (2)Dtestout includes unnatural examples such as emojis. We observed
the same in our preliminary experiments with MNIST; using 80 Million Tiny Images as DOEout , OE
increased the AUPR from 94.2% to 97.0%.
Secondly, we find that the closeness of DOEout to Dtestin can be an important factor in the success of
OE. In the NLP experiments, preprocessing DOEout to be closer to Din improves OOD detection per-
formance significantly. Without preprocessing, the network may discover easy-to-learn cues which
reveal whether the input is in- or out-of-distribution, so the OE training objective can be optimized
in unintended ways. That results in weaker detectors. In a separate experiment, we use Online Hard
Example Mining so that difficult outliers have more weight in Outlier Exposure. Although this im-
proves performance on the hardest anomalies, anomalies without plausible local statistics like noise
are detected slightly less effectively than before. Thus hard or close-to-distribution examples do
not necessarily teach the detector all valuable heuristics for detecting various forms of anomalies.
Real-world applications of OE could use the method of Sun et al. (2018) to refine a scraped DOEout
auxiliary dataset to be appropriately close to Dtestin .
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Figure 3: Root Mean Square Calibration Error
values with temperature tuning and temperature
tuning + OE across various datasets.
OE Improves Calibration. When using
classifiers for prediction, it is important that
confidence estimates given for the predictions do
not misrepresent empirical performance. A cal-
ibrated classifier gives confidence probabilities
that match the empirical frequency of correct-
ness. That is, if a calibrated model predicts an
event with 30% probability, then 30% of the time
the event transpires.
Existing confidence calibration approaches con-
sider the standard setting where data at test-time
is always drawn from Din. We extend this set-
ting to include examples from Dtestout at test-time
since systems should provide calibrated probabil-
ities on both in- and out-of-distribution samples.
The classifier should have low-confidence predic-
tions on these OOD examples, since they do not
have a class. Building on the temperature tuning
method of Guo et al. (2017), we demonstrate that
OE can improve calibration performance in this realistic setting. Summary results are shown in
Figure 3. Detailed results and a description of the metrics are in Appendix G.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed Outlier Exposure, a simple technique that enhances many current OOD
detectors across various settings. It uses out-of-distribution samples to teach a network heuristics
to detect new, unmodeled, out-of-distribution examples. We showed that this method is broadly ap-
plicable in vision and natural language settings, even for large-scale image tasks. OE can improve
model calibration and several previous anomaly detection techniques. Further, OE can teach density
estimation models to assign more plausible densities to out-of-distribution samples. Finally, Out-
lier Exposure is computationally inexpensive, and it can be applied with low overhead to existing
systems. In summary, Outlier Exposure is an effective and complementary approach for enhancing
out-of-distribution detection systems.
8
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2019
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank NVIDIA for donating GPUs used in this research. This research was supported by a grant
from the Future of Life Institute.
REFERENCES
Vassileios Balntas, Edgar Riba, Daniel Ponsa, and Krystian Mikolajczyk. Learning local feature
descriptors with triplets and shallow convolutional neural networks. British Machine Vision Con-
ference, 2016.
Peter L Bartlett and Marten H Wegkamp. Classification with a reject option using a hinge loss.
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 2008.
Petra Bevandic, Sinisa Segvic, Ivan Kreso, and Marin Orsic. Discriminative out-of-distribution
detection for semantic segmentation. arXiv preprint, 2018.
Ann Bies, Justin Mott, Colin Warner, and Seth Kulick. English web treebank, 2012.
Xinlei Chen and Abhinav Gupta. Webly supervised learning of convolutional networks. In Interna-
tional Conference on Computer Vision, 2015.
Kyunghyun Cho, Bart van Merrienboer, Caglar Gulcehre, Dzmitry Bahdanau, Fethi Bougares, Hol-
ger Schwenk, and Yoshua Bengio. Learning phrase representations using rnn encoder-decoder
for statistical machine translation. Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, 2014.
Patryk Chrabaszcz, Ilya Loshchilov, and Frank Hutter. A downsampled variant of imagenet as an
alternative to the cifar datasets. arXiv preprint, 2017.
Mircea Cimpoi, Subhransu Maji, Iasonas Kokkinos, Sammy Mohamed, and Andrea Vedaldi. De-
scribing textures in the wild. Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2014.
Jesse Davis and Mark Goadrich. The relationship between precision-recall and ROC curves. In
International Conference on Machine Learning, 2006.
Harm de Vries, Roland Memisevic, and Aaron Courville. Deep learning vector quantization. In
European Symposium on Artificial Neural Networks, Computational Intelligence and Machine
Learning, 2016.
Terrance DeVries and Graham W Taylor. Learning confidence for out-of-distribution detection in
neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.04865, 2018.
Andrew F Emmott, Shubhomoy Das, Thomas Dietterich, Alan Fern, and Weng-Keen Wong. Sys-
tematic construction of anomaly detection benchmarks from real data. In Proceedings of the ACM
SIGKDD workshop on outlier detection and description. ACM, 2013.
Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil Ozair,
Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. Generative adversarial networks. Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems, 2014.
Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial
examples. In International Conference on Machine Learning, 2015.
Chuan Guo, Geoff Pleiss, Yu Sun, and Kilian Q. Weinberger. On calibration of modern neural
networks. International Conference on Machine Learning, 2017.
Danijar Hafner, Dustin Tran, Alex Irpan, Timothy Lillicrap, and James Davidson. Reliable uncer-
tainty estimates in deep neural networks using noise contrastive priors. International Conference
on Machine Learning Workshop, 2018.
Dan Hendrycks and Thomas Dietterich. Benchmarking neural network robustness to common cor-
ruptions and surface variations. arXiv preprint, 2018.
9
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2019
Dan Hendrycks and Kevin Gimpel. A baseline for detecting misclassified and out-of-distribution
examples in neural networks. International Conference on Learning Representations, 2017.
Johnson et al. Tiny imagenet visual recognition challenge. URL https://tiny-imagenet.
herokuapp.com.
Alex Krizhevsky and Geoffrey Hinton. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images. Tech-
nical report, University of Toronto, 2009.
Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E Hinton. Imagenet classification with deep convo-
lutional neural networks. Neural Information Processing Systems, 2012.
Volodymyr Kuleshov and Percy Liang. Calibrated structured prediction. Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems, 2015.
Vijay Kumar, Gustavo Carneiro, and Ian Reid. Learning local image descriptors with deep siamese
and triplet convolutional networks by minimizing global loss functions. Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, 2016.
Kimin Lee, Honglak Lee, Kibok Lee, and Jinwoo Shin. Training confidence-calibrated classifiers
for detecting out-of-distribution samples. International Conference on Learning Representations,
2018.
Shiyu Liang, Yixuan Li, and R. Srikant. Enhancing the reliability of out-of-distribution image
detection in neural networks. International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
Si Liu, Risheek Garrepalli, Thomas Dietterich, Alan Fern, and Dan Hendrycks. Open category
detection with PAC guarantees. In Proceedings of International Conference on Machine Learning,
2018.
Ilya Loshchilov and Frank Hutter. Sgdr: Stochastic gradient descent with warm restarts, 2017.
Dhruv Mahajan, Ross Girshick, Vignesh Ramanathan, Kaiming He, Manohar Paluri, Yixuan Li,
Ashwin Bharambe, and Laurens van der Maaten. Exploring the limits of weakly supervised
pretraining. arXiv preprint, 2018.
Andrey Malinin and Mark Gales. Predictive uncertainty estimation via prior networks. Neural
Information Processing Systems, 2018.
Chris Manning and Hinrich Schu¨tze. Foundations of Statistical Natural Language Processing. MIT
Press, 1999.
Stephen Merity, Nitish Shirish Keskar, and Richard Socher. Regularizing and Optimizing LSTM
Language Models. International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018a.
Stephen Merity, Nitish Shirish Keskar, and Richard Socher. An Analysis of Neural Language Mod-
eling at Multiple Scales. arXiv preprint, 2018b.
Eric Nalisnick, Akihiro Matsukawa, Yee Whye Teh, Dilan Gorur, and Balaji Lakshminarayanan.
Do deep generative models know what they don’t know? International Conference on Learning
Representations, 2019.
Yuval Netzer, Tao Wang, Adam Coates, Alessandro Bissacco, Bo Wu, and Andrew Y. Ng. Reading
digits in natural images with unsupervised feature learning. In NIPS Workshop on Deep Learning
and Unsupervised Feature Learning, 2011.
Anh Nguyen, Jason Yosinski, and Jeff Clune. Deep neural networks are easily fooled: High confi-
dence predictions for unrecognizable images. In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2015.
Khanh Nguyen and Brendan O’Connor. Posterior calibration and exploratory analysis for natural
language processing models. Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, 2015.
Joan Pastor-Pellicer, Francisco Zamora-Martı´nez, Salvador Espan˜a-Boquera, and Marı´a Jose´ Castro-
Bleda. F-measure as the error function to train neural networks. In International Work-Conference
on Artificial Neural Networks (IWANN), 2013.
10
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2019
Alec Radford, Luke Metz, and Soumith Chintala. Unsupervised representation learning with deep
convolutional generative adversarial networks. International Conference on Machine Learning,
2016.
Alec Radford, Rafal Jozefowicz, and Ilya Sutskever. Learning to generate reviews and discovering
sentiment. arXiv preprint, 2017.
Olga Russakovsky, Jia Deng, Hao Su, Jonathan Krause, Sanjeev Satheesh, Sean Ma, Zhiheng
Huang, Andrej Karpathy, Aditya Khosla, Michael Bernstein, et al. Imagenet large scale visual
recognition challenge. International Journal of Computer Vision, 2015.
Ruslan Salakhutdinov, Joshua Tenenbaum, and Antonio Torralba. Learning to learn with compound
hd models. In Neural Information Processing Systems, 2011.
Tim Salimans and Diederik Kingma. Weight normalization: A simple reparameterization to accel-
erate training of deep neural networks. NIPS, 2016.
Tim Salimans, Andrej Karpathy, Xi Chen, and Diederik P Kingma. PixelCNN++: Improving the
PixelCNN with discretized logistic mixture likelihood and other modifications. International
Conference on Learning Representations, 2017.
Richard Socher, Alex Perelygin, Jean Wu, Jason Chuang, Christopher Manning, Andrew Ng, and
Christopher Potts. Recursive deep models for semantic compositionality over a sentiment tree-
bank. In Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, 2013.
Akshayvarun Subramanya, Suraj Srinivas, and R.Venkatesh Babu. Confidence estimation in deep
neural networks via density modelling. arXiv preprint, 2017.
Chen Sun, Abhinav Shrivastava, Saurabh Singh, and Abhinav Gupta. Large scale fine-grained cate-
gorization and the effectiveness of domain-specific transfer learning. Yin Cui and Yang Song and
Chen Sun and Andrew Howard and Serge Belongie, 2018.
Antonio Torralba, Rob Fergus, and William T Freeman. 80 million tiny images: A large data set for
nonparametric object and scene recognition. Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 2008.
Fisher Yu, Yinda Zhang, Shuran Song, Ari Seff, and Jianxiong Xiao. LSUN: construction of a
large-scale image dataset using deep learning with humans in the loop. CoRR, 2015.
Sergey Zagoruyko and Nikos Komodakis. Wide residual networks. British Machine Vision Confer-
ence, 2016.
Matthew D Zeiler and Rob Fergus. Visualizing and understanding convolutional networks. In
European Conference on Computer Vision. Springer, 2014.
Bolei Zhou, Agata Lapedriza, Aditya Khosla, Aude Oliva, and Antonio Torralba. Places: A 10
million image database for scene recognition. Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 2017.
Bo Zong, Qi Song, Martin Renqiang Min, Wei Cheng, Cristian Lumezanu, Daeki Cho, and Haifeng
Chen. Deep autoencoding gaussian mixture model for unsupervised anomaly detection. Interna-
tional Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
11
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2019
A EXPANDED MULTICLASS RESULTS
Expanded mutliclass out-of-distribution detection results are in Table 7 and Table 8.
FPR95 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din Dtestout MSP +OE MSP +OE MSP +OE
SV
H
N
Gaussian 5.4 0.0 98.2 100. 90.5 100.
Bernoulli 4.4 0.0 98.6 100. 91.9 100.
Blobs 3.7 0.0 98.9 100. 93.5 100.
Icons-50 11.4 0.3 96.4 99.8 87.2 99.2
Textures 7.2 0.2 97.5 100. 90.9 99.7
Places365 5.6 0.1 98.1 100. 92.5 99.9
LSUN 6.4 0.1 97.8 100. 91.0 99.9
CIFAR-10 6.0 0.1 98.0 100. 91.2 99.9
Chars74K 6.4 0.1 97.9 100. 91.5 99.9
Mean 6.28 0.07 97.95 99.96 91.12 99.85
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Gaussian 14.4 0.7 94.7 99.6 70.0 94.3
Rademacher 47.6 0.5 79.9 99.8 32.3 97.4
Blobs 16.2 0.6 94.5 99.8 73.7 98.9
Textures 42.8 12.2 88.4 97.7 58.4 91.0
SVHN 28.8 4.8 91.8 98.4 66.9 89.4
Places365 47.5 17.3 87.8 96.2 57.5 87.3
LSUN 38.7 12.1 89.1 97.6 58.6 89.4
CIFAR-100 43.5 28.0 87.9 93.3 55.8 76.2
Mean 34.94 9.50 89.27 97.81 59.16 90.48
C
IF
A
R
-1
00
Gaussian 54.3 12.1 64.7 95.7 19.7 71.1
Rademacher 39.0 17.1 79.4 93.0 30.1 56.9
Blobs 58.0 12.1 75.3 97.2 29.7 86.2
Textures 71.5 54.4 73.8 84.8 33.3 56.3
SVHN 69.3 42.9 71.4 86.9 30.7 52.9
Places365 70.4 49.8 74.2 86.5 33.8 57.9
LSUN 74.0 57.5 70.7 83.4 28.8 51.4
CIFAR-10 64.9 62.1 75.4 75.7 34.3 32.6
Mean 62.66 38.50 73.11 87.89 30.05 58.15
Ti
ny
Im
ag
eN
et
Gaussian 72.6 45.4 33.7 76.5 12.3 28.6
Rademacher 51.7 49.0 62.0 65.1 18.8 20.0
Blobs 79.4 0.0 48.2 100. 14.4 99.9
Textures 76.4 4.8 70.4 98.5 31.4 95.8
SVHN 52.3 0.4 80.8 99.8 42.8 98.2
Places365 63.6 0.4 76.9 99.8 36.3 99.3
LSUN 67.0 0.4 74.2 99.9 31.2 99.5
ImageNet 67.3 11.6 72.8 97.9 30.0 92.9
Mean 66.27 13.99 64.86 92.18 27.15 79.26
Pl
ac
es
36
5
Gaussian 37.1 9.4 72.2 93.5 23.5 54.1
Rademacher 60.4 13.5 47.7 90.2 14.6 44.9
Blobs 73.7 0.1 41.9 100.0 13.0 99.4
Icons-50 59.1 0.0 82.7 99.9 49.9 99.7
Textures 84.1 49.9 66.6 91.4 24.6 75.7
SVHN 19.9 0.0 96.6 100.0 90.5 99.9
ImageNet 86.3 65.3 63.0 86.5 25.1 69.7
Places69 87.3 87.5 61.5 63.1 23.4 24.9
Mean 63.46 28.21 66.51 90.57 33.08 71.04
Table 7: Vision OOD example detection for the maximum softmax probability (MSP) baseline de-
tector and the MSP detector after fine-tuning with Outlier Exposure (OE). All results are percentages
and the result of 10 runs. Values are rounded so that 99.95% rounds to 100%. More results are in
Appendix E.
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FPR90 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din Dtestout MSP +OE MSP +OE MSP +OE
20
N
ew
sg
ro
up
s
SNLI 38.2 12.5 87.7 95.1 71.3 86.3
IMDB 45.0 18.6 79.9 93.5 42.6 74.5
Multi30K 54.5 3.2 78.3 97.3 45.8 93.7
WMT16 45.8 2.0 80.2 98.8 43.7 96.1
Yelp 45.9 3.9 78.7 97.8 38.1 87.9
EWT-A 36.1 1.2 86.2 99.2 58.2 97.3
EWT-E 31.9 1.4 87.8 99.2 60.3 97.2
EWT-N 41.7 1.8 83.1 98.7 46.2 95.7
EWT-R 40.7 1.7 83.5 98.9 53.4 96.6
EWT-W 44.5 2.4 81.1 98.5 39.0 93.8
Mean 42.44 4.86 82.66 97.71 49.85 91.91
T
R
E
C
SNLI 18.2 4.2 94.0 98.1 81.9 91.6
IMDB 49.6 0.6 78.0 99.4 44.2 97.8
Multi30K 44.2 0.3 81.6 99.7 44.9 99.0
WMT16 50.7 0.2 78.2 99.8 42.2 99.4
Yelp 50.9 0.4 75.1 99.7 37.7 96.1
EWT-A 45.7 0.9 82.4 97.7 53.1 96.1
EWT-E 36.8 0.4 85.7 99.5 60.8 99.1
EWT-N 44.3 0.3 84.2 99.6 58.8 99.2
EWT-R 46.1 0.4 82.5 99.5 51.1 98.8
EWT-W 50.1 0.2 79.8 99.7 47.8 99.4
Mean 43.46 0.78 82.14 99.28 52.23 97.64
SS
T
SNLI 57.3 33.4 75.7 86.8 36.2 52.0
IMDB 83.1 32.6 54.3 85.9 19.0 51.5
Multi30K 81.3 33.0 58.5 88.3 21.4 58.9
WMT16 76.0 17.1 60.2 92.9 21.4 68.8
Yelp 82.0 11.3 54.2 92.7 18.8 60.0
EWT-A 72.6 33.6 62.7 87.2 21.4 53.8
EWT-E 68.1 26.5 68.5 90.4 27.0 63.7
EWT-N 73.8 27.2 63.8 90.1 22.6 62.0
EWT-R 79.6 41.4 58.1 85.6 20.3 54.7
EWT-W 74.8 17.2 60.3 92.8 21.2 66.9
Mean 74.86 25.31 61.61 90.07 22.93 64.37
Table 8: NLP OOD example detection for the maximum softmax probability (MSP) baseline detec-
tor and the MSP detector after fine-tuning with Outlier Exposure (OE). All results are percentages
and the result of 10 runs. Values are rounded so that 99.95% rounds to 100%.
Anomalous Data. For each in-distribution dataset Din, we comprehensively evaluate OOD detec-
tors on artificial and real anomalous distributions Dtestout following Hendrycks & Gimpel (2017). For
each learned distribution Din, the number of test distributions that we compare against is approxi-
mately double that of most previous works.
Gaussian anomalies have each dimension i.i.d. sampled from an isotropic Gaussian distribution.
Rademacher anomalies are images where each dimension is −1 or 1 with equal probability, so each
dimension is sampled from a symmetric Rademacher distribution. Bernoulli images have each pixel
sampled from a Bernoulli distribution if the input range is [0, 1]. Blobs data consist in algorithmi-
cally generated amorphous shapes with definite edges. Icons-50 is a dataset of icons and emojis
(Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2018); icons from the “Number” class are removed. Textures is a dataset
of describable textural images (Cimpoi et al., 2014). Places365 consists in images for scene recogni-
tion rather than object recognition (Zhou et al., 2017). LSUN is another scene understanding dataset
with fewer classes than Places365 (Yu et al., 2015). ImageNet anomalous examples are taken from
the 800 ImageNet-1K classes disjoint from Tiny ImageNet’s 200 classes, and when possible each im-
age is cropped with bounding box information as in Tiny ImageNet. For the Places365 experiment,
ImageNet is ImageNet-1K with all 1000 classes. With CIFAR-10 as Din, we use also CIFAR-100 as
Dtestout and vice versa; recall that the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 classes do not overlap. Chars74K is
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a dataset of photographed characters in various styles; digits and letters such as “O” and “l” were
removed since they can look like numbers. Places69 has images from 69 scene categories not found
in the Places365 dataset.
SNLI is a dataset of predicates and hypotheses for natural language inference. We use the hypotheses
for DOEout . IMDB is a sentiment classification dataset of movie reviews, with similar statistics to
those of SST. Multi30K is a dataset of English-German image descriptions, of which we use the
English descriptions. WMT16 is the English portion of the test set from WMT16. Yelp is a dataset
of restaurant reviews. English Web Treebank (EWT) consists of five individual datasets: Answers
(A), Email (E), Newsgroups (N), Reviews (R), and Weblog (W). Each contains examples from the
indicated domain.
Validation Data. For each experiment, we create a set of validation distributions Dvalout. The first
anomalies are uniform noise anomalies where each pixel is sampled from U [0, 1] or U [−1, 1] de-
pending on the input space of the classifier. The remaining Dvalout validation sources are generated
by corrupting in-distribution data, so that the data becomes out-of-distribution. One such source of
anomalies is created by taking the pixelwise arithmetic mean of a random pair of in-distribution im-
ages. Other anomalies are created by taking the geometric mean of a random pair of in-distribution
images. Jigsaw anomalies are created by taking an in-distribution example, partitioning the image
into 16 equally sized patches, and permuting those patches. Speckle Noised anomalies are created
by applying speckle noise to in-distribution images. RGB Ghosted anomalies involves shifting and
reordering the color channels of in-distribution images. Inverted images are anomalies which have
some or all of their color channels inverted.
B ARCHITECTURES AND TRAINING DETAILS
For CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny ImageNet classification experiments, we use a 40-2 Wide
Residual Network (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016). The network trains for 100 epochs with a
dropout rate of 0.3. The initial learning rate of 0.1 decays following a cosine learning rate sched-
ule (Loshchilov & Hutter, 2017). During fine-tuning of the entire network, we again use a cosine
learning rate schedule but with an initial learning rate of 0.001. We use standard flipping and data
cropping augmentation, Nesterov momentum, and `2 weight decay with a coefficient of 5 × 10−4.
SVHN architectures are 16-4 Wide ResNets trained for 20 epochs with an initial learning rate of
0.01 and no data augmentation. For Places365, we use a ResNet-18 pre-trained on Places365. In
this Places365 experiment, we tune with Outlier Exposure for 5 epochs, use 512 outlier samples per
iteration, and start with a learning rate of 0.0001. Outlier Exposure fine-tuning occurs with each
epoch being the length of in-distribution dataset epoch, so that Outlier Exposure completes quickly
and does involve reading the entire DOEout dataset.
C TRAINING FROM SCRATCH WITH OUTLIER EXPOSURE USUALLY
IMPROVES DETECTION PERFORMANCE
Elsewhere we show results for pre-trained networks that are fine-tuned with OE. However, a net-
work trained from scratch which simultaneously trains with OE tends to give superior results. For
example, a CIFAR-10 Wide ResNet trained normally obtains a classification error rate of 5.16% and
an FPR95 of 34.94%. Fine-tuned, this network has an error rate of 5.27% and an FPR95 of 9.50%.
Yet if we instead train the network from scratch and expose it to outliers as it trains, then the error
rate is 4.26% and the FPR95 is 6.15%. This architecture corresponds to a 9.50% RMS calibration
error with OE fine-tuning, but by training with OE from scratch the RMS calibration error is 6.15%.
Compared to fine-tuning, training a network in tandem with OE tends to produce a network with
a better error rate, calibration, and OOD detection performance. The reason why we use OE for
fine-tuning is because training from scratch requires more time and sometimes more GPU memory
than fine-tuning.
D OE WORKS ON OTHER VISION ARCHITECTURES
Outlier Exposure also improves vision OOD detection performance for more than just Wide
ResNets. Table 9 shows that Outlier Exposure also improves vision OOD detection performance
for “All Convolutional Networks” (Salimans & Kingma, 2016).
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FPR95 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din MSP +OE MSP +OE MSP +OE
SVHN 6.84 0.08 98.1 100.0 90.9 99.8
CIFAR-10 28.4 14.0 90.1 96.7 58.9 87.3
CIFAR-100 57.5 43.3 76.7 85.3 33.9 51.3
Tiny ImageNet 75.5 25.0 55.4 82.9 25.6 75.3
Table 9: Results using an All Convolutional Network architectures. Results are percentages and an
average of 10 runs.
E OUTLIER EXPOSURE WITH H(U ; p) SCORES DOES BETTER THAN WITH
MSP SCORES
While−maxc fc(x) tends to be a discriminative OOD score for example x, models with OE can do
better by using −H(U ; f(x)) instead. This alternative accounts for classes with small probability
mass rather than just the class with most mass. Additionally, the model with OE is trained to give
anomalous examples a uniform posterior not just a lower MSP. This simple change roundly aids
performance as shown in Table 10. This general performance improvement is most pronounced
on datasets with many classes. For instance, when Dtestout = Tiny ImageNet and Dtestout = Gaussian,
swapping the MSP score with the H(U ; f(x)) score increases the AUROC 76.5% to 97.1%.
FPR95 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din MSP H(U ; p) MSP H(U ; p) MSP H(U ; p)
CIFAR-10 9.50 9.04 97.81 97.92 90.48 90.85
CIFAR-100 38.50 33.31 87.89 88.46 58.15 58.30
Tiny ImageNet 13.99 7.45 92.18 95.45 79.26 85.71
Places365 28.21 19.58 90.57 92.53 71.04 74.39
Table 10: Comparison between the maximum softmax probability (MSP) andH(U ; p) OOD scoring
methods on a network fine-tuned with OE. Results are percentages and an average of 10 runs.
For example, CIFAR-10 results are averaged over “Gaussian,” “Rademacher,” . . ., or “CIFAR-100”
measurements.
F EXPANDED LANGUAGE MODELING RESULTS
Detailed OOD detection results with language modeling datasets are shown in Table 11.
FPR90 ↓ AUROC ↑ AUPR ↑
Din Dtestout BPC +OE BPC +OE BPC +OE
PTB Char
Answers 96.9 49.93 82.1 89.6 81.0 89.3
Email 99.5 90.64 80.6 88.6 79.4 89.1
Newsgroup 99.8 99.39 75.2 85.0 73.3 85.5
Reviews 99.0 74.64 80.8 89.0 79.2 89.6
Weblog 100.0 100.0 68.9 79.2 67.3 80.1
Mean 99.0 89.4 77.5 86.3 76.0 86.7
PTB Word
Answers 41.4 3.65 81.4 98.0 40.5 94.7
Email 64.9 0.17 78.1 99.6 44.5 98.9
Newsgroup 54.9 0.17 77.8 99.5 39.8 98.3
Reviews 30.5 0.85 88.0 98.9 53.6 96.8
Weblog 50.8 0.08 80.7 99.9 41.5 99.7
Mean 48.5 0.98 81.2 99.2 44.0 97.8
Table 11: OOD detection results on Penn Treebank examples and English Web Treebank outliers.
All results are percentages.
TheDtestout datasets come from the English Web Treebank (Bies et al., 2012), which contains text from
five different domains: Yahoo! Answers, emails, newsgroups, product reviews, and weblogs. Other
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NLPDtestout datasets we consider do not satisfy the language modeling assumption of continuity in the
examples, so we do not evaluate on them.
G CONFIDENCE CALIBRATION
Models integrated into a decision making process should indicate when they are trustworthy, and
such models should not have inordinate confidence in their predictions. In an effort to combat a
false sense of certainty from overconfident models, we aim to calibrate model confidence. A model
is calibrated if its predicted probabilities match empirical frequencies. Thus if a calibrated model
predicts an event with 30% probability, then 30% of the time the event transpires. Prior research
(Guo et al., 2017; Nguyen & O’Connor, 2015; Kuleshov & Liang, 2015) considers calibrating
systems where test-time queries are samples from Din, but systems also encounter samples from
Dtestout and should also ascribe low confidence to these samples. Hence, we use OE to control the
confidence on these samples.
G.1 METRICS
In order to evaluate a multiclass classifier’s calibration, we present three metrics. First we es-
tablish context. For input example X ∈ X , let Y ∈ Y = {1, 2, . . . , k} be the ground truth
class. Let Ŷ be the model’s class prediction, and let C be the corresponding model confi-
dence or prediction probability. Denote the set of prediction-label pairs made by the model with
S = {(ŷ1, c1), (ŷ2, c2), . . . , (ŷn, cn)}.
RMS and MAD Calibration Error. The Root Mean Square Calibration Error measures the
square root of the expected squared difference between confidence and accuracy at a confidence
level. It has the formula
√
EC [(P(Y = Ŷ |C = c)− c)2] . A similar formulation which less severely
penalizes large confidence-accuracy deviations is the Mean Absolute Value Calibration error, written
EC [|P(Y = Ŷ |C = c)− c|]. The MAD Calibration Error is a lower bound of the RMS Calibration
Error. To empirically estimate these miscalibration measures, we partition the n samples of S into
b bins {B1, B2, . . . , Bb} with approximately 100 samples in each bin. Unlike Guo et al. (2017),
bins are not equally spaced since the distribution of confidence values is not uniform but dynamic.
Concretely, the RMS Calibration Error is estimated with the numerically stable formula√√√√ b∑
i=1
|Bi|
n
(
1
|Bi|
∑
k∈Bi
1(yk = ŷk)− 1|Bi|
∑
k∈Bi
ck
)2
.
Along similar lines, the MAD Calibration Error—which is an improper scoring rule due to its use
of absolute differences rather than squared differences—is estimated with
b∑
i=1
|Bi|
n
∣∣∣∣ 1|Bi| ∑
k∈Bi
1(yk = ŷk)− 1|Bi|
∑
k∈Bi
ck
∣∣∣∣.
Soft F1 Score. If a classifier makes only a few mistakes, then most examples should have high
confidence. But if the classifier gives all predictions high confidence, including its mistakes, then the
previous metrics will indicate that the model is calibrated on the vast majority of instances, despite
having systematic miscalibration. The Soft F1 score (Pastor-Pellicer et al., 2013; Hendrycks &
Gimpel, 2017) is suited for measuring the calibration of a system where there is an acute imbalance
between mistaken and correct decisions. Since we treat mistakes a positive examples, we can write
the model’s confidence that the examples are anomalous with ca = (1 − c1, 1 − c2, . . . , 1 − cn).
To indicate that an example is positive (mistaken), we use the vector m ∈ {0, 1}n such that mi =
1(yi 6= ŷi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then the Soft F1 score is
cTam
1T(ca +m)/2
.
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RMS Calib. Error ↓ MAD Calib. Error ↓ Soft F1 Score ↑
Din Temperature +OE Temperature +OE Temperature +OE
SVHN 22.3 4.8 10.9 2.4 52.1 87.9
CIFAR-10 19.4 9.3 12.6 5.6 39.9 69.7
CIFAR-100 14.7 8.2 11.3 6.5 52.8 65.8
Tiny ImageNet 12.0 6.9 9.0 4.8 62.9 72.2
Table 12: Calibration results for the temperature tuned baseline and temperature tuning + OE.
G.2 SETUP AND RESULTS
There are many ways to estimate a classifier’s confidence. One way is to bind a logistic regression
branch onto the network, so that confidence values are in [0, 1]. Other confidence estimates use the
model’s logits l ∈ Rk, such as the estimate σ(maxi li) ∈ [0, 1], where σ is the logistic sigmoid.
Another common confidence estimate is maxi
[
exp (li)/
∑k
j=1 exp (lj)
]
. A modification of this
estimate is our baseline.
Softmax Temperature Tuning. Guo et al. (2017) show that good calibration can be ob-
tained by including a tuned temperature parameter into the softmax: p̂(y = i | x) =
exp(li/T )/
∑k
j=1 exp(lj/T ). We tune T to maximize log likelihood on a validation set after the
network has been trained on the training set.
Results. In this calibration experiment, the baseline is confidence estimation with softmax
temperature tuning. Therefore, we train SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny ImageNet
classifiers with 5000, 5000, 5000, and 10000 training examples held out, respectively. A copy of
this classifier is fine-tuned with Outlier Exposure. Then we determine the optimal temperatures
of the original and OE-fine-tuned classifiers on the held-out examples. To measure calibration,
we take equally many examples from a given in-distribution dataset Dtestin and OOD dataset Dtestout .
Out-of-distribution points are understood to be incorrectly classified since their label is not in
the model’s output space, so calibrated models should assign these out-of-distribution points low
confidence. Results are in Table 12. Outlier Exposure noticeably improves model calibration.
G.3 POSTERIOR RESCALING
While temperature tuning improves calibration, the confidence estimate p̂(y = i | x) cannot be less
than 1/k, k the number of classes. For an out-of-distribution example like Gaussian Noise, a good
model should have no confidence in its prediction over k classes. One possibility is to add a reject
option, or a (k+1)st class, which we cover in Section 5. A simpler option we found is to perform an
affine transformation of p̂(y = i | x) ∈ [1/k, 1] with the formula (p̂(y = i | x)− 1/k)/(1− 1/k) ∈
[0, 1]. This simple transformation makes it possible for a network to express no confidence on an
out-of-distribution input and improves calibration performance. As Table 13 shows, this simple 0-1
posterior rescaling technique consistently improves calibration, and the model fine-tuned with OE
using temperature tuning and posterior rescaling achieved large calibration improvements.
RMS Calib. Error ↓ MAD Calib. Error ↓ Soft F1 Score ↑
Din Temp +Rescale +OE Temp +Rescale +OE Temp +Rescale +OE
SVHN 22.3 20.8 3.0 10.9 10.1 1.0 52.1 56.1 92.7
CIFAR-10 19.4 17.8 6.7 12.6 11.7 4.1 39.9 42.8 73.9
CIFAR-100 14.7 14.4 8.1 11.3 11.1 6.4 52.8 53.1 66.1
Tiny ImageNet 12.0 11.9 6.9 9.0 8.8 4.8 62.9 63.1 72.3
Table 13: Calibration results for the softmax temperature tuning baseline, the same baseline after
adding Posterior Rescaling, and temperature tuning + Posterior Rescaling + OE.
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H ADDITIONAL ROC AND PR CURVES
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Figure 4: ROC curves with Tiny ImageNet asDin and Textures, Places365, LSUN, and ImageNet as
Dtestout . Figures show the curves corresponding to the maximum softmax probability (MSP) baseline
detector and the MSP detector with Outlier Exposure (OE).
In Figure 4, we show additional PR and ROC Curves using the Tiny ImageNet dataset and various
anomalous distributions.
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